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How	the	EU	can	better	protect	the	rule	of	law	in	its
member	states
The	EU	is	in	the	process	of	adopting	a	new	regulation	to	help	protect	the	rule	of	law	in
member	states.	Drawing	on	the	cases	of	Hungary	and	Poland,	Nanette	Neuwahl	and
Charles	Kovacs	argue	that	the	proposed	regulation	would	be	a	valuable	addition,	but
that	a	somewhat	revised	litigation	strategy	of	the	European	Commission	could	also	help
defend	EU	values.
Since	2010,	the	EU	has	been	confronted	with	the	question	of	what	to	do	when	a	member	state	moves,	through	free
elections	and	without	coercion,	towards	authoritarian	rule	and	systemic	breaches	of	the	very	values	underlying	the
EU.	The	root	causes	of	this	problem	have	been	in	the	extension	of	the	EU	into	Eastern	Europe	and	in	the	history
and	culture	of	the	new	member	states.
Eight	Central	European	countries	joined	the	EU	in	2004,	accepting	all	the	acquis	instantly.	The	newcomers	were
much	poorer	than	the	other	member	states	and	had	very	different	cultures	and	histories.	Unlike	Western	Europe,
most	of	the	new	member	states	had	long	lacked	sovereignty,	even	while	retaining	a	strong	sense	of	their
nationhood,	culture	and	languages.	It	was	anticipated	that	their	economic	handicap	would	gradually	disappear,
while	their	institutional	and	political	development	was	not	expected	to	conflict	with	their	commitments	under	the
Treaty	of	European	Union	(TEU),	as	they	were	free	and	the	experience	of	40-50	years	of	Communist	rule	was
presumed	to	have	immunised	central	Europe	against	backsliding	into	authoritarianism.
Those	hopes	seemed	well	placed	until	2010,	when	in	Hungary,	Viktor	Orban’s	populist	party,	Fidesz,	won	two-thirds
of	the	seats	in	Parliament	and	thus	the	ability	to	amend	the	Constitution	and	to	enact	all	sensitive	legislation	that
required	a	two-thirds	majority.	In	short	order,	his	regime	promulgated	a	new	constitution	which	greatly	weakened
checks	and	balances	between	the	branches	of	the	government.	In	2011,	the	Media	Act	expanded	the	government’s
powers	over	the	media,	while	in	2012	the	electoral	law	was	amended	to	greatly	favour	the	ruling	party.	In
subsequent	years,	the	government	continued	to	centralise	power,	and	filled	nominally	independent	institutions
including	the	Prosecution	Service,	the	Media	Authority	and	the	National	Bank	with	sympathisers.
After	retaining	its	two-thirds	majority	in	the	2014	General	Election,	Fidesz	adopted	a	more	belligerent	nationalistic
tone,	assuring	the	electorate	of	its	resolve	to	defend	Hungarian	and	Christian	values	and	cultures.	This	achieved
credibility	during	the	2015	refugee	crisis	when	hundreds	of	thousands	of	mostly	Middle	Eastern	people	passed
through	Hungary,	heading	for	Western	Europe.	Orban	responded	by	erecting	a	patrolled	fence	along	the	Serbian
border	and	vowing	not	to	accept	any	refugee	quotas	under	EU	plans	to	relieve	Italy	and	Greece.	This	appeared
popular	given	Hungary’s	history	of	400	years	of	wars	against	the	Ottoman	Empire.	There	followed	widely	publicised
campaigns	against	George	Soros	and	the	Central	European	University,	foreign	financed	NGOs,	and	Brussels,	all
perceived	as	threats	to	Hungarian	sovereignty	and	values.
Simultaneously,	Orban	gained	increased	control	of	the	print	media	through	generously	paid	purchases	made	by
sympathisers.	By	October	2017,	these	owned	almost	all	of	Hungary’s	main	newspapers	and	magazines.
Meanwhile,	corruption	benefiting	oligarchs	allied	with	the	government	became	pervasive,	organised	and
centralised.	Thus,	without	coercion	and	with	little	opposition,	Hungary	has	gradually	moved	towards
authoritarianism.
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Polish	Prime	Minister	Mateusz	Morawiecki	with	Hungarian	Prime	Minister	Viktor	Orbán	and	Belgian	Prime	Minister	Sophie	Wilmès,
Credit:	European	Union
The	EU	viewed	these	developments	with	concern	but	did	not	act.	This	was	in	marked	contrast	to	its	treatment	of
Poland,	where	from	2015,	through	13	laws,	the	government	undermined	the	independence	of	the	country’s	justice
system.	Although	unlike	Hungary,	Poland	was	rated	as	a	“free	country”	by	Freedom	House,	with	political	rights	and
civil	liberties	intact,	on	20	December	2017,	the	European	Commission	initiated	Article	7	proceedings	against	Poland
for	breaching	European	values.	In	Hungary’s	case,	the	Commission	decided	to	abstain	from	acting,	arguably
because	it	needed	the	approval	of	the	Parliament’s	EPP	group,	of	which	Fidesz	was	a	member,	to	complete	its
legislative	programme.	It	remained	for	the	European	Parliament	to	trigger	the	Article	7	process,	in	September	2018.
It	is	common	ground	that	the	Article	7	procedure	is	slow	and	unwieldy	and	leads	to	sanctions	only	if	the	offending
Member	State	has	no	allies	in	the	European	Council.	Since	then,	four	corrective	‘recommendations’	were	issued	by
the	EU	against	Poland.	After	three	meetings,	Poland	made	changes	in	some	of	the	offending	laws,	without	however
impairing	its	increased	control	over	the	judiciary.	Two	meetings	took	place	with	Hungary,	but	these	proved
occasions	for	Hungary’s	justice	minister	to	officially	record	a	strong	objection	to	the	substance	and	validity	of	all
charges.
In	the	Polish	2019	general	election,	the	governing	Law	and	Justice	party	won	another	four-year	term,	albeit	with	a
reduced	majority.	Since	then,	the	publicly	owned	media	has	become	more	hostile	to	opposition	parties	and	NGOs,
while	the	government	has	started	to	adopt	tactics	mimicking	those	of	Fidesz.
Meanwhile	in	Hungary,	in	late	2018	the	regime	further	increased	its	control	of	the	media,	as	the	pro-Fidesz	owners
of	more	than	400	publications	and	several	important	web	sites	donated	all	of	these	to	KESMA	(the	Central
European	Press	and	Media	Foundation),	governed	also	by	Fidesz	sympathisers.	The	centralisation	of	the	content	of
those	news	outlets	led	to	a	steady	drumbeat	of	anti-EU	messages	and	interviews,	with	ministers	charging	that	the
Article	7	proceedings	were	Brussels’	revenge,	orchestrated	by	George	Soros,	against	Hungary’s	resistance	to	the
EU’s	pro-immigrant	policies.	Although	in	the	2019	municipal	elections,	Fidesz	lost	several	cities	including	Budapest,
the	next	general	election	is	not	due	until	2022,	and	under	the	current	Electoral	Law,	it	will	be	almost	impossible	for
opposition	parties	to	win.
In	response	to	this	situation,	the	European	Parliament	concluded	in	a	resolution	on	16	January	2020,	that	“the
situation	in	both	Poland	and	Hungary	has	deteriorated	since	the	triggering	of	Article	7(1)”	and	that	“failure	by	the
Council	to	make	effective	use	of	Article	7	continues	to	undermine	the	integrity	of	common	European	values,	mutual
trust	and	the	credibility	of	the	European	Union	as	a	whole.”	Today,	Freedom	House	deems	that	Hungary	has	left	the
category	of	democracies	after	interfering	with	education	and	the	arts	(2019)	and	most	recently,	adopting	emergency
laws	allowing	the	government	to	rule	by	decree	(2020).
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Legal	action	against	aspects	of	democratic	backsliding	is	currently	not	very	effective.	Firstly,	courts,	even	when
independent,	are	reluctant	to	intervene	in	the	actions	of	democratically	elected	governments,	and	secondly,
member	states	in	principle	have	discretion	in	prescribing	remedies	for	a	breach	of	EU	law.	Declaratory	judgments
by	courts,	though	important,	may	not	solve	the	actual	problems.
The	EU	is	now	refining	its	instruments	for	the	protection	of	European	values.	The	latest	innovation	is	the	proposed
regulation	on	the	protection	of	the	Union’s	budget	in	case	of	generalised	deficiencies	as	regards	the	rule	of	law.
This	allows	administrative	action	to	be	taken	through	a	constructive	interaction	between	the	Commission,	the
Council	and	the	Parliament.	The	latter	delegate	power	to	the	Commission	to	take	administrative	action	on	the	basis
of	the	recommendations	of	a	panel	of	independent	experts.
The	instrument	has	several	distinct	advantages.	The	delegation	of	power	avoids	the	impression	of	a	unilateral
power	grab	by	the	Commission	and	makes	it	less	necessary	to	trigger	the	high	profile	and	potentially	unwieldy
procedure	under	Article	7.	The	application	of	this	instrument	will	encourage	reflection	on	what	constitutes	an
actionable,	systematic	breach	of	fundamental	values.	It	will	also	help	prevent	divisions	from	appearing	between
Member	States	in	favour	of	and	against	defending	EU	values.	While	Hungary,	Poland	and	Austria	are	probably
among	the	latter,	France,	Germany	and	Luxembourg	are	possibly	among	the	former.
The	effectiveness	of	the	EU	is	at	stake	and	the	recognition	of	its	very	raison	d’être.	If	the	EU	does	not	lead	the	way,
it	risks	being	looked	upon	unfavourably	both	by	those	who	do	not	want	it	to	intervene,	as	well	as	by	those	who	want
it	to	do	so	resolutely.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Integration
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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